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James’s Epistemology and the Will
to Believe
Christopher Hookway
1 When we look for distinctively pragmatist contributions to epistemology, we are likely to
turn to Peirce’s criticisms of Cartesianism and his insights into induction, adbuction and
the method  of  science.  We  may  also  examine  Dewey’s  criticisms  of  the  “Quest  for
Certainty” and his work in what he called “logic” and the theory of inquiry. We are less
likely  to  turn to the writings  of  William James whose interests  and insights  may be
supposed  to  lie  elsewhere.  The  aim  of  this  paper  is  to  identify  some  Jamesian
contributions to our under- standing of epistemic norms. I shall argue that a number of
views which have become prominent in contemporary epistemology, and some of which
are  often  described  as  pragmatist  approaches  to  epistemology  can  be  traced  to  the
writings of James. And I shall consider how far the doctrine of the “Will to Believe” is an
application  of  these  epistemological  views.  I  shall  argue  that  James  was  an  earlier
defender of epistemic contextualism and epistemic conservatism, and I shall also suggest
that some of his insights are in harmony with contemporary virtue epistemology.
 
I. Epistemic Contextualism
2 First  we  shall  examine  some  evidence  that  James  was  sympathetic  to  epistemic
contextualism. Contextualists hold that whether a belief counts as knowledge, or whether
it is justified, can depend upon the context of the believer or the context of the person
who is evaluating the belief (see DeRose 1992). In some circumstances, higher standards
are required for a belief to count as justified than in others. For example, suppose that I
am in the supermarket and the question arises whether we need to buy lasagne. Trusting
my memory that I saw lasagne in the pantry yesterday morning, I dismiss the question,
confident that I know that we possess lasagne. But suppose that I have already planned an
important  dinner  for  tomorrow,  and  the  availability  of  lasagne  is  an  indispensable
ingredient of it.  Since my memory may be fallible and the consequences of my being
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wrong could be serious, I wouldn’t claim knowledge that we possess lasagne. This has
often been thought to offer a strategy for defusing skepticism. The context in which we
can take seriously the possibility that we are dreaming or deceived by an evil demon may
not be relevant to everyday beliefs that we are using to guide our actions. Contextualists
often  invoke  the  phenomenon  of  “pragmatic  encroachment”:  the  standards  of
justification  that  we  employ  in  a  particular  context  depend upon how the  belief  in
question is to be used and upon how damaging it would be if the belief turned out to be
false. Thus more (or better) evidence is required for belief in results of medical research
than for casual reflection.
3 What is the evidence that William James would have favoured epistemic contextualism?
The place to begin is “The will to believe,” James’s response to Clifford’s account of the
“Ethics  of  belief.”  James  is  responding  to  one  of  the  fundamental  principles  of
W.K.Clifford’s “Ethics of belief.” According to Clifford:
It  is  wrong  always,  everywhere,  and  for  everyone,  to  believe  anything  upon
insufficient evidence. (Clifford 1897: 186)
4 For Clifford, this rule is an ethical principle: “Belief is desecrated when given to unproved
and unquestioned statements for the solace and private pleasure of the believer.” Such
belief  is  “sinful”  (ibid.).  As  is  well  known,  Clifford  used  this  principle  to  mandate
agnosticism about religious matters.
5 James’s paper argues that, in appropriate circumstances, it can be rational or appropriate
to form or retain beliefs when you possess relatively little, or even no, relevant evidence.
His argument rests upon identifying the particular circumstances in which belief can be
formed on “passional grounds.” In identifying these circumstances, he is specifying the
sort of context in which belief may be legitimate when we have no or little relevant
evidence.
6 James  specifies  the  contextual  requirements  for  such  belief  to  be  legitimate.  One
requirement  is  that  the  correctness  of  the  belief  in  question  cannot  be  settled
intellectually. Others concern the practical urgency of settling whether to endorse the
proposition in question, and the lack of alternative courses of action which do not depend
upon  this  belief.  This  urgency  can  depend  upon  the  risks  involved  in  suspending
judgment in the proposition in question or in arriving at a belief which is in fact fals
(James 1897: 2-4).
7 A contextualist response to Clifford’s position can take two different forms. One is to
observe that the term “sufficient evidence” is vague or context relative. We may suppose
that in different contexts, different amounts of evidence will count as sufficient. Someone
may argue that the amount of evidence that would be sufficient for a casual belief where
the risk of error has little weight would be insufficient when engaging in, for example,
medical  research.  In that  case,  we could continue to endorse the principle as  it  was
formulated by Clifford, but deny that it has the consequences which Clifford expects it to
have.  Alternatively,  James  could  hold  that  Clifford’s  principle  is  applicable  in  some
circumstances but not in others. As we shall see, James’s response is of the second of
these kinds. He does not address how we should understand when evidence is sufficient.
8 In section VII of “The Will to Belief,” James writes:
There are two ways of looking at our duty in the matter of opinion, – ways entirely
different,  and  yet  ways  about  whose  different  the  theory  of  knowledge  seems
hitherto have shown very little concern. We must know the truth; and we must avoid
error. (1897: 17)
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9 These “two separable laws” “Believe truth!” and “Shun error” can be in tension, and “by
choosing between them we may end by coloring differently our whole intellectual life”
(1897: 18). James’s view is that in some contexts, we should give prominence to one of
these laws, and in other contexts, we should rely upon the other. We want to obtain truth
and we want to avoid falsehood, and we weigh these desiderata differently in different
contexts. In effect, we have to choose between competing (prima facie) duties, and context
determines which of those duties we should give priority to in a particular case. Clifford’s
view appears to be that one of these duties (the avoidance of error) should be given
absolute priority.
10 In science, he tells us, “and even in human affairs in general, the need of acting is seldom
so urgent that a false belief to act on is better than no belief at all.” In science, we value
the avoidance of error more than obtaining truth: we can wait to reach the truth. But
“Moral questions present themselves as questions whose solution cannot wait for sensible
proof” (James 1897: 22).  And the “Law courts have to decide on the basis of the best
evidence attainable for the moment, for the judge’s duty is to make laws as well as to
ascertain it” (James 1897: 20). James presents the issue by saying that there are two laws,
and we can only follow one of them on any specific occasion, so we need an account of
which we should follow. A more plausible kind of pragmatism would hold that we have,
not  two  laws  but  rather  two  values  which  carry  different  weights  in  different
circumstances, making use of Bayesian ideas and decision theory (Hookway 2005, Levi
1998).  Although  James´s  way  of  describing  the  issue  may  have  to  be  rejected,  it  is
evidently a precursor of these more sophisticated views.
 
II. Contextualism and the Will to Believe
11 According to James, it is legitimate to believe propositions which cannot be settled by
intellectual means when the choice meets some specific contextual circumstances. We
can illustrate this by reference to one of James’s examples. Suppose that I am about to be
interviewed for a job, and my current evidence does not give me conclusive reasons for
thinking that I will. I am currently undecided about whether my application for the job
will be successful. It is important to me that I get the job, and I believe that it is possible,
to some degree at least, that I will. Let us suppose that I also believe, quite reasonably,
that if I am confident that I will succeed, I am likely to perform much more impressively
in the interview than I would if I was uncertain about the outcome. If I can bring myself
to believe that  I  will  succeed,  then I  am not irrational  to do so.  I  should not follow
Clifford’s  apparent  advice  that  I  am irresponsible  if  I  do  not  carefully  evaluate  my
evidence and, recognizing that it does not settle the matter, abandon my belief and take
an agonistic stance on the matter. As is well known, James discerns a similar structure in
our reflections about whether we should retain, or perhaps adopt, religious belief. If I
recognize that I  face a “genuine option” which is  “forced” and “momentous,” and it
cannot be resolved by intellectual means, I am not irrational to hold on to a belief for
which I do not possess conclusive evidence (James 1897: 2-4).
12 Interestingly, the philosopher of science, Bas van Fraassen describes James’s strategy in
“Belief and the will” (1985) as the application to the case of religious belief of a strategy of
belief  formation  which  is  widespread  in  science.  He  interprets  Clifford’s  notion  of
“sufficient evidence” as conclusive evidence, and argues that when we accept beliefs on
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inductive grounds,  we have to rely upon non-evidential  considerations.  Perhaps it  is
rational to trust our current opinions even if, in a fallibilist spirit, we think there is a
good chance that they will be refuted by further evidence. This is because doing so will be
the best means of advancing our long term scientific goals of improving our scientific
understanding of our surroundings. If we believe propositions on less than conclusive
evidence,  we  initiate  processes  that  will  lead  to  a  more  thorough  testing  of  the
hypothesis, and perhaps to a better articulation of it. So van Fraassen’s view is that, both
in  the  case  of  religious  belief  and  scientific  belief,  it  is  a  good  strategy  to  believe
propositions for which we have less than “sufficient” evidence, because we have non-
evidential considerations for doing so.
 
III. James and Peirce on Science and Belief: A
Comparison
13 In 1998,  Peirce gave a series  of  lectures to the “Cambridge Conferences.”  They were
subsequently published in Reasoning and the Logic of Things (Peirce 1992). Some scholars
interpret the first of these lectures, “Philosophy and the conduct of life” as a rejection of
James’s  doc  trine  of  the  Will  to  Belief.  Their  differences  may  be  less  than  is  often
supposed. We can see this by considering their views about the role of belief in science.
14 James holds that ‘whenever the option of losing truth and gaining it is not momentous,
we can throw the chance of gaining truth away and at any rate save ourselves from any
risk of believing falsehood.” We can do this by suspending judgment, by neither believing
nor disbelieving the proposition in question. According to James, this is almost always the
case in science.
The most  useful  investigator,  because  the most  sensitive  observer,  is  always  he
whose eager interest in one side of the question is balanced by an equally keen
nervousness lest he become deceived.
Science  has  organized  this  nervousness  into  a  regular  technique,  her  so-called
method of verification; and she has fallen so deeply in love with the method that
one may say that she has ceased to care for truth by itself at all. (James 1897: 21)
15 So James is ready to follow Clifford’s rule in serious scientific research. Indeed, if truth is
presented “in affirmative form,” “she would decline to touch it” (ibid.).  Agreeing with
Clifford, James endorses the observation that “such truth as that […] would be stolen in
defiance of [science’s] duty to mankind” (ibid.).
16 In Peirce´s Cambridge lectures (Peirce 1992: 111-2) he agreed with James. He insists that
what is properly and usually called belief […] has no place in science at all […] because
“nothing is vital for science; nothing can be” (CP1.635). “The true scientific investigator
completely loses sight of the utility of what he is about” (CP1.619). Peirce seems to hold
that, in pure science, the avoidance of error should be given priority. This provides an
interesting  contrast between  Peirce  and  van  Fraassen.  Peirce  holds  that  current
philosophical  results  are  not  a  matter  of  belief  but  are,  rather,  the  objects  of  more
tentative forms of acceptance. But Van Fraassen seems to think that current scientific
results are believed, but that the belief in is not supported by “sufficient” evidence, and
the belief has a non-evidential basis. The differences noted here may be less significant
than they appear: Peirce, as well as denying that we believe current scientific results, talks
about “scientific belief,” a state which is more provisional or tentative than full belief.
Even if fallibilist scientists allow that the sort of acceptance scientific belief involves is
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more tentative than ordinary common-sense beliefs, if may be appropriate to treat this as
a variety of (scientific) belief. However it is also important to recognize that the religious
belief which James obtains on the basis of his “passional considerations” could not be a
kind of tentative acceptance of the sort that Peirce and Popper would say was appropriate
for scientific opinions.
17 Peirce’s  agreement  with  James  goes  further.  When  we  are  concerned  with  “vitally
important issues,” matters of urgency and importance for our lives, we should not trust
to fallible scientific results. In vital matters, “the principle on which we are willing to act
is a belief” (1992: 112). “Theoretical knowledge, of science,” he says, “has nothing directly
to say concerning practical  matters” (1992:  112).  Whether we should believe depends
upon  context:  we should  be  tentative  about  believing  current  scientific  results;  and
whether we should believe is a function of how ready will be to risk possessing a false
belief on the matter. Van Fraassen may suggest that James’s doctrine of the will to believe
should lead us to take such risks when acquiring scientific beliefs, while Peirce would not.
But  James’s  views  here  seem  to  be  closer  to  Peirce’s  than  to  van  Fraassen’s.  Both




18 We now turn to the second epistemological position that is reflected in James’s writings,
epistemic conservatism. We can provide a positive justification for some of our beliefs.
We can point to evidence that supports them or a proof that demonstrates their truth.
However, for many of our beliefs, we can provide no positive justification at all. We may
forget  how  we  acquired  them.  They  are  things  that  we  have  learned  but  haven´t
forgotten. If  we have no positive justification for accepting some proposition,  are we
justified in believing it? The argument of Descartes’s first Meditation holds that if we lack
positive justification for a belief,  then this itself  constitutes a reason for doubting it.
Epistemic conservatives reject this Cartesian assumption. Beliefs are justified unless we
have positive reason for doubting them:
19 If  someone already believes  some proposition,  then they  are  prima facie  rational  in
continuing to believe it.
20 You only need to be able to provide reasons for continuing to hold a settled belief if you
are presented with a “defeater” for it, something that suggests that the proposition is
false or something that suggests you were not entitled to hold it.
21 Beliefs are justified unless there is a positive reason for doubting them: the concept of a
reason for doubt is more fundamental than the concept of a reason for belief. This opens
up a range of interesting issues about just what constitutes a reason for doubting a stably
held belief. Why are we justified in ignoring the sorts of hypothetical reasons for doubt
which are proposed by proponents of skepticism?
22 This form of conservatism is often defended by philosophers sympathetic to the common-
sense tradition. It is also found in Wittgenstein’s On Certainty and it is sometimes assumed
by epistemologists defending externalist views of justification and knowledge. It is also
found in the writings of pragmatist philosophers such as Isaac Levi (1998) and Peirce (see
Hookway 2008). Peirce calls upon philosophers “not to pretend to doubt in philosophy
what we do not doubt in our hearts” (1868, EP1: 29). Later, in 1906, he wrote that “what
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one does not doubt cannot be rendered more satisfactory than it already is” (CP6.498).
And Levi defended “the principle of doxastic inertia” which holds that “there is no need
to justify current beliefs, only changes in belief” (Levi 1998: 78).
23 James’s commitment to the principle of doxastic inertia is evident from his 1908 lectures
on Pragmatism, especially in lecture II in which he explains “What pragmatism means”
and introduces his pragmatist account of truth. Acknowledging the influence of Schiller
and Dewey,  he considers how we arrive at new opinions,  concluding that process by
which this occurs is always the same.
The individual has a stock of old opinions already, but he meets a new experience
that puts them to a strain. Somebody contradicts them; or in a reflective moment
he discovers that they contradict each other; or he hears of facts with which they
are incompatible; or desires arise in him which they cease to satisfy. The result is an
inward trouble to which his mind till then had been a stranger, and from which he
seeks to escape by modifying his previous mass of opinions. He saves as much of it
as he can, for in this matter of belief we are all extreme conservatives. So he tries to
change first this opinion and then that […] until at last some new idea comes up
which he can graft  upon the ancient  stock with a  minimum disturbance of  the
latter. (James 1907: 34)
24 James’s conservatism is manifest when he writes that we “preserve the older stock of
truths with a minimum of modification, stretching them enough to make them admit the
novelty, but conceiving that in ways as familiar as the case leaves possible” (James 1907:
35).
25 The insistence on this conservatism, this preservation of the “older stock of belief,” is
very important for James. He suggests that taking this seriously was indispensable if we
are to recognize what is wrong with many of the criticisms made of pragmatism. Indeed,
he says that loyalty to the older truths “is the first principle in revising and forming our
beliefs rationally” (ibid.:  35). Pragmatism’s critics are disturbed by the suggestion that
there is no independent or object constraint upon what we believe: perhaps, they suggest,
we can reasonably accept anything which it suits our needs to believe. Rationalists and
some other realists and empiricists offer different candidate explanations of why and how
our opinions are constrained by reason, or by the facts, or by experience. Loyalty to the
older facts provides another kind of  constraint.  They reflect  what we know (fallibly)
about reality and our determination to be loyal to these older facts and thus indicate thus
we want to revise our beliefs in a way that preserves what we take ourselves to know. We
trust our beliefs until given reason to doubt them, not whenever we think it would suit us
to change them.
26 How does James’s epistemic conservatism relate to the argument of “The will to believe”?
It  is  useful  to  distinguish  two versions  of  the  sort  of  view that  James  defends,  two
contexts from which his argument may be employed.
27 First, consider the position of someone who currently holds religious belief. They don’t
reflect much upon the belief’s evidential credentials, but they find holding such a belief
ful- filling. Clifford would probably regard this person as epistemically irresponsible: we
have  an  obligation  to  ensure  that  such  a  belief  is,  indeed,  supported  by  “sufficient
evidence.”  James’s  epistemic  conservatism  would  give  reason  for  rejecting  this
requirement. In most cases, beliefs are innocent unless we think there is a positive reason
for  doubting  them.  Perhaps  the  argument  of  “The  will  to  believe”  would  provide
additional support for resisting the demand that we investigate the epistemic credentials
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of the belief. It may be suggested that the suspicion that the belief has been sustained by
non-evidential considerations does not provide positive reason for doubting it.
28 Second, consider the position of someone who is initially an agnostic about the existence
of God. Clifford’s view is such a person should proceed by collecting evidence, and their
agnosticism should not be replaced by stable belief until they have “sufficient evidence”
either for or against the truth of the religious proposition. This is the version that can
seem problematic: James spears to recommend that this person should manipulate his
beliefs by seeking out experiences which would contribute to the onset of religious belief.
29 James’s  observation that  a  better  title  for  his  paper  would  have  been “The right  to
believe” may support the first of these two positions, and it is significant that Peirce’s
view of the rationality of religious belief fist this view as well. Suspicious of any attempt
to ground religious belief in arguments or theories, he held that “pretty nearly everybody
more or less believes that God is real,  including many of the scientific men who are
accustomed to think the belief is entirely unfounded” (CP 6.496). Indeed, religious belief
is  manifested  in  attitudes  and  practices,  and  it  would  be  “folly”  to  think  that
“metaphysical  theory  in  regard  to  the  mode  of  being of  the  perfect”  could  damage
religious belief (W3: 322, and see Hookway 2000: chapter 11).
 
V. Virtue Epistemology and Our Epistemic
Temperaments
30 So far, we have said little about the epistemic relevance of “passional considerations.”
Over the last twenty years, a number of philosophers have defended versions of virtue
epistemology, approaches to the study of epistemic evaluation which are analogous to
virtue theories in ethics (DePaul & Zabzebski 2003; Hookway 2003). Such views have taken
a number of different forms. Some involve recognizing that epistemic evaluation rests
upon possession of capacities or skills which can be describes as “excellences.” Others
place emphasis upon the possession of favourable character traits, traits which enable us
to form beliefs responsibly or to inquire well.  Some virtue epistemologists argue that
success in scientific investigations – or in other kinds of investigations – depends upon
the  possession  of  appropriate  traits.  For  example,  we  must  possess  curiosity,  open-
mindedness, and diligence in testing theories, and so on. One way in which our epistemic
evaluations  are  manifested,  according  to  this  kind  of  view,  is  through  affective  or
emotional responses. Real or “felt” doubt about our beliefs can take the form of a sort of
epistemic anxiety or “fear.” Someone who possesses the epistemic virtue will respond
with doubt or anxiety about the belief in question. Just as fear alerts us to salient threats
to our lives or activities, so doubt, epistemic anxiety, alerts us to salient problems, or
salient weaknesses in our epistemic position. Epistemic virtues are varies, but we would
expect that success in our reasoning and inquiry depends upon possessing traits such as
curiosity, open-mindedness, and other traits. And if we take seriously James’s first lecture
on Pragmatism in 1906, we learn of the importance of temperament to our practices,
recognizing  that  commitments  to  tough  minded  empiricism  or  to  tender  minded
rationalism reflect different temperaments or character traits. When we are guided by
these temperamental traits, we are guided by “passional considerations” and according to
James, his kind of pragmatist has the ability to recognize the strengths and weaknesses of
both sorts of temperamental trait.
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31 James’s account of the legitimacy of belief is contextualist, conservative, and in the spirit
of virtue epistemology.  All  of these features contribute to his defence of the “will  to
believe” doctrine. Whether they are the whole of his argument may be less clear. But his
insistence that, for example, belief in molecules is grounded in the prestige of those who
tell us about them and van Fraassen’s claim that the grounds on which we believe current
fallible scientific results are similar to those employed in James’s argument for the will to
believe offers some support for the idea that James’s reasons for believing in God draw on
similar sorts of considerations.
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ABSTRACTS
William James’s paper “The Will to Believe” defends some distinctive and controversial views
about the normative standards that should be adopted when we are reflecting upon what we
should  believe.  He  holds  that,  in  certain  special  kinds  of  cases,  it  is  rational  to  believe
propositions even if we have little or no evidence to support our beliefs. And, in such cases, he
holds  that  our  beliefs  can be  determined by  what  he  calls  “passional  considerations”  which
include “fear and hope, prejudice and passion, imitation and partisanship, the circumpressure of
our caste and set” (1897: 9). On most occasions “we find ourselves believing, we hardly know how
or why.” When James allows passional considerations a major role in determining the rationality
of belief and argues that it is rational to form beliefs in advance of the evidence, he can easily be
understood as holding that belief can be responsible when it is not warranted by epistemological
norms. Belief can be rational and responsible when the reasons which support it are entirely
prudential or practical. The question I am concerned with here is: how far can James’s argument
in “The Will  to Believe” be understood as an application of some views which are genuinely
epistemological? One question we can ask about these views is: how far are they an application of
a distinctively pragmatist approach to epistemological concerns about when belief is justified? One
possibility is that James is making some original contributions to epistemology which may have
echoes in contemporary epistemology. I shall argue that this interpretation of James’s argument
is more plausible than it at first appears.
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